The subset sum problem, which is often called as the knapsack problem, is known as an NP-hard problem, and there are several cryptosystems based on the problem. Assuming an oracle for shortest vector problem of lattice, the low-density attack algorithm by Lagarias and Odlyzko and its variants solve the subset sum problem efficiently, when the "density" of the given problem is smaller than some threshold. When we define the density in the context of knapsack-type cryptosystems, weights are usually assumed to be chosen uniformly at random from the same interval. In this paper, we focus on general subset sum problems, where this assumption may not hold. We assume that weights are chosen from different intervals, and make analysis of the effect on the success probability of above algorithms both theoretically and experimentally. Possible application of our result in the context of knapsack cryptosystems is the security analysis when we reduce the data size of public keys. key words: subset sum problem, knapsack problem, low-density attack, lattice reduction
Introduction
When a set of positive integers (weights) S = {a 1 , . . . , a n } (a i a j ) and a positive integer s are given, finding a vector e = (e 1 , . . . , e n ) ∈ {0, 1} n satisfying n i=1 a i e i = s, is called the subset sum problem (or the knapsack problem), and is known as an NP-hard problem in general (see, e.g., [4] ). Lagarias-Odlyzko [8] and Brickell [1] independently found an algorithm (LO algorithm, hereafter) that solves subset sum problems, using lattice reduction algorithm. Both methods almost always solve the problem in polynomial time if we assume a shortest vector oracle of a lattice and if the density of the subset sum problem is less than 0.6463 . . . , where the density d is defined by d = n/(log 2 max i a i ).
(
Coster, Joux, LaMacchia, Odlyzko, Schnorr, and Stern raised the critical density up to 0.9408 . . . (CJLOSS algorithm, hereafter) [2] . They assumed that all a i 's are chosen uniformly at random from an interval (0, A] for some integer A, and the density was defined as
Since these algorithms are effective against subset sum problems with relatively low densities, they are sometimes called the "low-density attack" in the context of breaking knapsack-type cryptosystems. However, in general density cases, the subset sum problem is still hard. In the LO algorithm, the subset sum problem is reduced to the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) of a lattice constructed from the given problem, and one or two SVP oracle calls are admitted. Although no polynomial-time algorithms that solve Shortest Vector problem are known, the polynomial-time algorithm by Lenstra, Lenstra & Lovász (LLL algorithm) [7] solves it with some approximation factor and works relatively better in practice than in theory. One can also use the block Korkine-Zolotarev(BKZ) algorithm [11] (as in [12] ), which provides better approximation factor but may not work in polynomial-time, if its block length parameter gets larger.
There have been proposed several public key cryptosystems whose security is based on the hardness of the subset sum problem. For example, Chor-Rivest proposed a cryptosystem that can use subset sum problems with relatively high densities [3] . Though the system was attacked by an algebraic approach [13] , the attack may not be valid in general cases. Okamoto-Tanaka-Uchiyama proposed another cryptosystem OTU, in an attempt to resist adversaries that can run quantum computers [10] .
In these cryptosystems the Hamming weight of solutions is bounded by βn for a small constant β ≤ 1/2. In general cases, we can take β = 1/2. In cases β is relatively small, Coster et al. [2] give improvements on their CJLOSS algorithm, which we refer as CJLOSS+ algorithm in this paper.
Our Motivation and Contributions:
In the context of knapsack-type cryptosystems, public key a i 's are often generated by taking the value mod A for some integer A. Hence it would be reasonable to adapt the following assumption: In this case, the density can be defined as Eq. (2), and the effectiveness of LO algorithm is well analyzed.
On the other hand, in general subset sum problems, this assumption may not always hold and the effectiveness of LO algorithm is not well known. In this paper, we focus on general subset sum problems and analyze its hardness, mainly from theoretical interests. As LO algorithm can be applied to general subset sum problems and often works efficiently, analyzing its effectiveness is very important in order to an- As the expected bit length of an integer that is chosen uniformly at random from the interval (0, 2 m −1] is around m−1, this assumption would be reasonable in some sense. In a nutshell, this assumption means that small weight is chosen from a small interval and large weight is chosen from a large interval. Hence, in this paper we analyze the effectiveness of LO algorithm when we adapt this assumption 3.
In general cases, efficient attacks might be possible by decomposing the problem, but we focus on solving the problem by LO algorithm, as it can be applied in any case. We introduce another density d HM under this assumption, and see its validity as a criterion for the hardness of the subset sum problem theoretically. We also make experiments of solving subset sum problem changing the bit lengths of the weights and make analysis of the effect on the success probability.
Possible application of our work in the context of knapsack-type cryptosystems is the security analysis of the system when we reduce the data size of public keys. If we would like to reduce the total public key size in knapsacktype cryptosystems, we need to have weights with shorter bit length. In order to assure the security of such systems, we need to analyze the hardness of general subset sum problems in our setting.
In Sect. 2 we briefly look over the previous works regarding as LO algorithm and its variants using lattice reduction, and consider changing the bit lengths of weights which motivated our work. In Sect. 3, we assume that weights are chosen from different intervals respectively, and present theoretical results in asymptotic case. We also look into nonasymptotic case and analyze the success probability of LO algorithm and its variants through experiments.
Previous Works and Concerns
In this section, we review LO algorithm by Lagarias and Odlyzko, and improvements by Coster et al.
(CJLOSS/CJLOSS+ algorithm).
Then we give our attentions to changing the bit lengths of weights. We see the effect on the success probability of CJLOSS+ algorithm, when we change the bit lengths of weights.
LO Algorithm and its Variants
First we review the LO algorithm:
Input: a 1 , ..., a n and s Output: (e 1 , ..., e n ) ∈ {0, 1} n s.t.
N ← √ n invoke a shortest vector oracle with the following basis:
.., e n , e n+1 ) be the return value; if n i=1 ±a i e i = s and ±e i ∈ {0, 1} for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and e n+1 = 0 then output ±(e 1 , ..., e n ) and halt; else output "not found" end Theorem 1 ([8] ). Let A be a positive integer, and let a 1 , . . . , a n be random integers with 0 < a i ≤ A for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let e = (e 1 , . . . , e n ) ∈ {0, 1} n be arbitrary, and let s = n i=1 e i a i . If the density d < d 0 = 0.6463 . . . , then LO algorithm "almost always" solves the subset sum problem defined by a 1 , . . . , a n and s, assuming a shortest vector problem oracle.
As we would like to assume that the number of i's such that e i = 1 is less than or equal to n 2 , we actually execute the procedure also for s = (
In CJLOSS algorithm, N is replaced by 1 2 √ n , and vector b n+1 is replaced by
±a i e i = s and ±e i ∈ {0, 1} is replaced by checking if . We also have the following theorem.
Theorem 2 ([2]
). Let A be a positive integer, and let a 1 , . . . , a n be random integers with 0 < a i ≤ A for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let e = (e 1 , . . . , e n ) ∈ {0, 1} n be arbitrary, and let s = n i=1 e i a i . If the density d < d 1 = 0.9408 . . . , then CJLOSS algorithm "almost always" solves the subset sum problem defined by a 1 , . . . , a n and s, assuming a shortest vector problem oracle. In some cryptosystems such as the Chor-Rivest cryptosystem, the Hamming weight k of solutions is bounded by k = βn for a small constant β ≤ 1/2. Coster et al. remarked further improvement (CJLOSS+ algorithm) in such cases. In CJLOSS+ algorithm, N is replaced by β(1 − β)n , and vector b n+1 is replaced by (β, β, ..., β, Ns).
±a i e i = s and ±e i ∈ {0, 1} is replaced by checking if n i=1 a i (±e i + β) = s and e i ∈ {±(1 − β), ±β}, and the output is replaced by (±e 1 + β, . . . , ±e n + β).
Changing Bit Lengths of Weights
In the definition of the density (1), it is determined only by the maximum value of given weights if the number n of weights is fixed.
Even if the maximum value of weights is fixed, changing the bit lengths of other weights may effect the success probability of LO algorithms and its variants. We see this through experiments.
First, we take n = 60 and the Hamming weight k of the solution is 6. We take a i 's of bit length 60 or 40, change their ratio, and run CJLOSS+ algorithm 1000 times for each ratio. When we fix the ratio, we choose different sets of a i 's 1000 times without changing the ratio. As a lattice reduction algorithm, we use block Korkine-Zolotarev algorithm with block length 20. Table 1 shows the success probability of CJLOSS+ algorithm in percentage. Though the density of a i 's are almost 1 except the top row of the table, success probability varies.
We see another pattern of weights where bit lengths are uniformly distributed. The numbers in the left column of Table 2 represents the number n of weights. The numbers in the first row represents the bit length m of a i 's. "71 − 80" means that bit lengths are uniformly distributed from 71 to 80, i.e. there are 7 or 8 a i 's for each bit length. Other numbers in the table represent the success probability of CJLOSS+ algorithm in percentage, when we run the algorithm 1000 times, generating n random weights of bit length m for each time. As a lattice reduction algorithm, we use block Korkine-Zolotarev algorithm with block length 20. The column of bit length m = 71 − 80 and the column of bit length m = 80 in Table 2 has almost the same density according to the definition (1), as the maximum bit length m of weights is 80. Even though they have almost the same density, the success probability gets smaller for m = 71−80.
These phenomena indicate that the definition (1) of the density may not be fully appropriate.
Analysis in Case Weights are Chosen from Different Intervals
In previous works, it is assumed that weights are chosen from a unique interval. In this section we assume that they are chosen from different intervals respectively, and we describe our theoretical and experimental analysis in that case.
Theoretical Results in Asymptotic Case
Theorem 3. Let e = (e 1 , . . . , e n ) (0, . . . , 0) ∈ {0, 1} n be fixed. Let A 1 , . . . , A n be positive integers and a 1 , . . . , a n be integers chosen uniformly and independently at random with 0 < a i ≤ A i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let s = n i=1 e i a i , and let L be a lattice spanned by the following basis:
. . .
where N is a positive integer larger than √ n. Let δ(u 0 ) be the minimum value of the following function of u ∈ R + :
and let c 0 denote (log 2 e)δ(u 0 ). Then the probability P that the shortest vector in L is not equal toê = (e 1 , . . . , e n , 0) is less than
Note that the critical density d 0 = 0.6463 . . . in LO algorithm case coincides with 1 c 0 in above statement [9] .
Proof. Let t = n i=1 a i . We may assume that
because otherwise any a i ≥ t/n may be removed from consideration. The vectorê = (e 1 , . . . , e n , 0) is contained in L.
We should consider the probability that there exists a vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x n , x n+1 ) satisfying the following conditions:
where ||x|| represents Euclidean norm of x. Thenx satisfies the condition (3) only when x n+1 = 0, because otherwise we have ||x|| ≥ |x n+1 | ≥ N > √ n ≥ ||ê|| which contradicts the condition (3). Hence we have some integer y that satisfies
holds, because
and without loss of generality we may assume that ||e|| ≤ n/2. Let x denote x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), and z i = x i − ye i . Then we have
From Lemma 1 in [9] , the first term of (4) is bounded by 2 (log 2 e)δ(u)n for any u ∈ R + . From Theorem 1 in [9] , there exists some value u 0 ∈ R + such that δ(u) has its minimum value at u = u 0 . Writing (log 2 e)δ(u 0 ) as c 0 , the first term of (4) is bounded by 2 c 0 n . When z n = z n−1 = . . . = z i+1 = 0 and
Hence we can estimate the last term of (4) by
If for some c > c 0 ,
Proof. From Theorem 3, we have
Above Corollary 1 indicates that in case we choose a i 's from different periods A 1 , . . . , A n , we may use another indicator as its density:
If we assume an SVP oracle of lattice, we can asymptotically solve the subset sum problem when d HM is smaller than the critical density d 0 = 0.6463 . . . . The reason why harmonic mean of A i 's appears here is as follows. In the inequality (4) of theorem 3, we bound the third term Pr
. In theorem 2, the corresponding term is bounded by
for some A and replace A in the definition of usual density (2) with A in our case, we are able to prove our statement. 
where H is the binary Entropy function H(x) = −x log x − (1 − x) log(1 − x), and k is the Hamming weight of the solution: (A 1 , . . . , A n ) .
In the case of CJLOSS algorithm, we similarly have following results: Theorem 4. Let e = (e 1 , . . . , e n ) (0, . . . , 0) ∈ {0, 1} n be fixed. Let A 1 , . . . , A n be positive integers and a 1 , . . . , a n be integers chosen uniformly and independently at random with
e i a i , and let L be a lattice spanned by the following basis:
where N is a positive integer larger than 
In case of CJLOSS+ algorithm, we use the following function δ β (u) of u ∈ R + (Theorem 3.1 in [5] ):
If we set β = in an asymptotic case. However, when we deal with concrete subset sum problems where n is a fixed value, we should rather analyze the coefficients P i minutely. For example, if the range of the distribution of bit lengths is wide, the value of
for smaller a i will get far greater than that of larger a i , hence the harmonic mean of a i 's will lean to smaller a i and the effect of larger a i in the indicator d HM might get smaller than its actual effect.
Another factor we have to consider is the approximate factor of the actual lattice reduction algorithms. However, as the running time grows exponentially if we use the exact algorithms, considering this effect is a difficult task in analyzing results of actual experiments.
Application in the Context of Knapsack Cryptosystems
Possible application of our work in the context of knapsacktype cryptosystems is to use it in the security analysis of the system when we reduce the data size of public keys. If we would like to reduce the total public key size in knapsacktype cryptosystems, we need to have weights with shorter bit lengths. For example, if we have 80 public key weights with 80-bit each, total public key size is 6400 bits. If we have 80 weights with bit lengths between 61 to 80, 4 keys for each bit length, total public key size is 5640 bits, reducing 11.9% of public key data size. In order to assure the security of the system, we need to analyze the hardness of general subset sum problems in our setting.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we considered the hardness of general subset sum problems against LO algorithm and its variants, with an assumption that weights are chosen from different intervals respectively. In asymptotic case, we introduced another density that works as an criterion for the success probabilities of LO algorithm and its variants, and obtained some theoretical results. In non-asymptotic case, we saw the effectiveness and concerns of our new density through concrete experiments. Possible application of our result in the context of knapsack cryptosystems is the security analysis when we reduce the data size of public keys.
Our future work will be to get tighter bounds for the success probability of LO algorithm and its variants, which will be useful for estimating the hardness of general subset sum problems more precisely.
